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INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.
The dogs of Constantinople, we are told, have their own ter-
ritorial limitations. They follow a stranger to the limit of their
wards, but invariably halt upon the frontier with as much defer-
ence to the boundary as a French soldier at an outpost of the
German Empire. It is not difficult to understand how these lim-
its have been established. Originally, the hungry animals
roamed everywhere, seeking after food; but, in time, they fell
into habitual rounds, and became attached to certain places
where there were exceptional chances for a dinner. New-
comers were attacked and driven away, and these in turn estab-
lished themselves in less desirable quarters, repelling invasion
with a similar ferocity. Thus originated a division of the city
into canine wards, or, to change the figure, tribal aggregates
were formed, and territorial limits were established by frontier
battles, which fixed lines of permanent compromise between the
bands of contestants.
Every sensitive being tends to exercise its native powers and
gratify its native appetites. This brings it in conflict with other
creatures; and, if it survives, it must adopt a course of behavior
toward its fellow-creatures of the same and of different species
which will insure its escape from their rapacity or revenge.
Thus, for every order of beings, a course of conduct is marked
out which is most advantageous in the struggle for existence.
The formula descriptive of this course-that is, the rule accord-
ing to which the being acts-is the natural law of that being's
life.
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Man has had no exemption from these universal conditions of
existence; and, when ie reached the level of reflective capacity,
he found himself already a member of a society shaped for him
by the forces of nature, and was compelled to conform to certain
rules of action which had been unconsciously introduced.
Society is the creature as well as the creator of custom; and, in
its natural sense, "law" is the parent rather than the child of
social existence. "Long. before any supreme political authority
has come into being," says Sheldon Amos, "a series of practical
rules determine the main relations of family life, the conditions
of ownership, the punishment of the more violent forms of moral
wrong-doing, and the adjustment of contracts. The mode in
which such rules are formulated seems to be the following: A
spontaneous practice is first followed, and, if good and useful, is
generally copied over and over again, the more so as habit and
association always render the imitation of an old and familiar
practice easier than inventing a new and untried one. "1
But at last a stage is reached in the social evolution of man at
which a distinct verbal formulation of custom in precepts or
maxims becomes desirable; and, when law has attained this ex-
pression in propositions, all that is necessary to modify or create
it is the power to enforce compliance with new requirements upon
the individuals who form the community. When this point of
development is reached, a new force enters into society. From
that moment it becomes possible to transcend actual custom by
setting up ideals .of justice, which shall henceforth react upon
practice with the elevating power and logical consistency of prin-
ciples of equity rationally applied. All that is then needed to
establish theoretically the dominion of reason over human action
is the transfer of legislative authority from the hands of arbi-
trary individual rulers to the sovereign people, or their direct rep-
resentatives, by constitutional provisions. For the accomplish-
ment of this task many centuries have been required, but the
growth of legislative privilege has been, in late years, more rapid
than the development of legislative capacity. For the practical
perfection of the work of legislation, however, there is still
needed a higher development of popular intelligence, which
alone can raise the standard of the law-making power.
Parallel with the evolution of law as an institutional growth,
there has been a corresponding development of the idea of jus-
tice. Primarily, this idea arises from the experience of inequal-
ity, and at first appears in the negative form of equalizing inju-
I The Science of Law, p. 49.
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ries inflicted. Deprivation of the common objects of desire by
the exercise of superior force was an early human experience.
The impulse to regain that which was taken away or, if this was
impossible, to make an equal reprisal led to a state of warfare
which was rendered the more intense the longer it continued.
The communistic or tribal nature of primitive property made
every invasion of individual rights a tribal insult, to be avenged
in kind. The murder of a man involved his next of kin in the
obligation, extended at last to the entire tribe, to slay the mur-
derer, and every lesser injury required a corresponding retor-
sion. Thus grew up the lex talionis, universal at all the lower
levels of humanity. So far there was absolutely no idea of jus-
tice, except as the equipoise of injuries. This conception is far
from being outgrown in the present civilized States of Christen-
dom, and runs through our statutes, our codes, and our theology,
wherever the idea of retributive justice appears. It is essen-
tially a purely negative notion, an equation of evils and injuries,
not a positive conception of indestructible obligations binding
men and nations to deeds of mutual beneficence.
The early and negative notion of justice is wholly material,
and expresses a relation between measurable things and quanti-
ties. According to this idea, there is no debt of injury that
cannot be paid, and none that should not be. Duty consists in
inflicting an equal injury upon an enemy. A little extra dam-
age may safely be done, as he will be certain to retaliate, and
whatever is done against him now will be so much to our credit
on the next account. Such a conception, of course, contemplates
perpetual antagonism as following from a law of nature, and
therefore, to be expected. There is no logical stopping-place in
a series of settlements upon this theory, where every truce is.
only a rest in preparation for a new aggression.
But the positive and modem idea of justice is at every point
in opposition to this crude compensation of evil with evil. It is
a rational conception, based upon the idea of personality as a
power of infinitely expansive tendency. Every human being has
an inherent right to become all that his nature and capacities permit
of his becoming, as he develops toward the realization of his own
ideal. Unnecessary restriction of this development cannot be
justified on any rational ground. The only interference that can
be permitted is that which necessarily results from the conflict of
rights in the process of individual expansion. The freedom of
the individual is absolute, except as it interferes with the equal
freedom of other individuals, and to find, determine, and fix
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with authority the limits of this freedom, as restricted by the
equal freedom of all, is the problem of justice.
This conception applies equally to men and nations. Like
every human individual, every free, independent and sovereign
State has a tendency to expand, to exercise its powers, to develop
its resources, and to realize its national destiny as apprehended
by itself. -International justice is the problem presented by the
moral and physical necessity of finding, determining, and fixing
with authority the limits of this freedom of growth and expan-
sion as restricted by the equal freedom of all independent and
sovereign States. It is a problem of colossal magnitude and of
supreme importance to human welfare. Within a few months
we have seen the two greatest nations of the earth, speaking the
same language, accepting the same religion, animated by the
same legal, institutional, and humanitarian traditions, counting
their battle-ships, enumerating their available forces of men and
artillery, and estimating the extent of their financial credit if, in
an expected crisis, there should be a declaration of war between
their respective governments. Prior to the appearance of the
morning newspapers which sent a thrill of astonishment and
dismay through more than a hundred millions of human beings,
there was not on either side of the Atlantic the faintest suspicion
that war was a possibility. And, in reality, it was not possible
except through a criminal blunder; for the good sense and
friendly spirit of these two peoples were such that deliberation
alone was needed to show .to both that such an enterprise is
unnecessary, unwise, and unreasonable. But the bare possibil-
ity that two civilized nations could be flung into the arena of
battle by the accidents of diplomatic mismanagement or misun-
derstanding over a question which does not seriously affect the
interest of either country shows that it is not untimely to con-
sider deliberately the condition of those international relations
which could be so easily disturbed, and whose disturbance would
involve the best part of humanity in the barbarities and atroci-
ties of primitive tribes of savages seeking to efface one another
from the surface of the earth.
The establishment of international justice upon a basis as
secure and peaceable as that of municipal justice in civilized states
would not seem to be a chimera, and yet it is invested with diffi-
culties of considerable magnitude. Three conditions at least
must be fulfilled before a system of perfect international justice
can be created and rendered fully effective: (x) a code of Inter-
nationl Law must be formulated, and recognized as binding
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upon sovereign states; (2) a method of adjusting differences by
the application of this code must be devised; and (3) a means
must be discovered of enforcing the decisions arrived at through
the method of adjustment. These three conditions involve
quite unequal degrees of inherent difficulty, and present different
stages of approach to realization. For the sake of clearness, it
may be well to consider them in the order of statement.
I. THE CODES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
I. The recognition of international rights has been almost
exclusively confined to modern times and Western civilization.
The ancient absolute monarchies of the Orient, even more than
those of the present, were intolerant of all national pretensions
except their own, and lived in a state of almost uninterrupted
warfare with their neighbors. Their ignorance of distant
nations and their feuds and quarrels with adjacent peoples ren-
dered peaceable intercourse almost impossible, and the idea of
justice between States was therefore unborn.
The Greeks recognized the independence of other States,
both Hellenic and non-Hellenic, and had diplomatic intercourse
with them to a limited extent; but they were accustomed to
regard all foreigners as barbarians. Their customs in war were
extremely cruel, and their policy in peace did not extend beyond
the unification of Greece against the barbarian world. In their
domestic alliances, dictated by community of blood and civiliza-
tion, they attained a conspicuous degree of federation. "Among
the Greek cities and States a certain recognition of international
justice was shown by the action of the Amphictyonic Coundil, an
institution more religious than political, for the pacific adjust-
ment of disputes. That council had doubtless some influence in
restraining the savagery of intestine wars by binding its mem-
bers not to destroy any of the Amphictyonic towns, not to tarn
away their running waters, and not to commit theft in the tem-
ple of Delphi, the common center of the confederacy.", But the
authority of the council was confined to the twelve Hellenic
nations associated in the worship of the same gods.
The Romans established far wider foreign relations than the
Greeks, but in their treatment of other nations they were not
governed by any body of justice. "Blinded by the desire for
universal dominion," says Leone Levi, "the Romans did not see
that any International Law did or could exist, and, if they
apprehended its existence, they certainly did not acknowledge its
2 Leone Levi, "" International Law," p. io.
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authority nor observe its doctrines. ' The flus gentium was,
indeed, better known to them than to any other nation of antiq-
uity, but they understood by it those natural principles of jus-
tice that underlie all national customs in common, and are,
therefore, applicable to all men and countries. But they did not
apply these great principles as between States, probably for the
reason that they did not distinctly recognize the equal and recip-
rocal rights of all nations, especially as against themselves.
Theirfis feciale, applied by the colitgium fcialium, was intended
to control the conduct of their armies toward other nations dur-
ing war, and the declaration of war was in the power of this col-
lege. But the fecial law was not founded upon the consent of
other nations, and was, therefore, in no proper sense, a form of
international law.
During the whole of the period between the downfall of the
Roman Empire and the close of the Dark Ages some of the Med-
iterranean cities maintained more or less intimate commercial
relations, and the first movement toward the formation of codes
of law applicable to foreign intercourse seems to have originated
from the requirements of maritime commerce. Everywhere
upon land there was some kind of local authority, but the sea,
"that great common of mankind," beyond the jurisdiction of any
king, was the open field of piracy and plunder. What the Chris-
tian religion, originally so full of peace and the ppirit of human
unity, had failed to do when rendered a political power by
official adoption, the interests of trade attempted to accomplish,
and justice upon the sea was the first step toward justice among
the nations. "The Jugements of Ol6ron" was a body of regu-
lations governing the navigation of the Western seas, believed to
have been drawn up in the eleventh century. It was long recog-
nized in most of the Alantic ports of France, and was afterwards
incorporated in the maritime law of Louis XIV. "The Conso-
lato del Mare," or "Customs of the Sea," was a more preten-
tious collection of rules pertaining to commerce and navigation
both in peace and war. Its provisions regarding prize law long
prevailed in the maritime code of Europe, and have been re-
affirmed in many treaties. Other sea laws, such as the "Guidon
de la Mer," the "Laws of Wisbuy," and the "Ordinances of the
Hanseatic League," mark the wider extension of the maritime
laws and policy of the Mediterranean. All of them are believed
to contain elements extracted from the oldest known maritime
code, the "Rhodian laws."
3 International Law, p. xx.
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Among the causes that contributed to the development of
International Law we must mention the decay of feudalism.
Dating back to the migration of the Teutonic tribes into Western
and Southwestern Europe, in the third and sixth centuries, this
system of land tenure was unfavorable to the existence of sover-
eign States. The fiefs had been at first precariously held, being
without any guarantee except possession. By the connivance of
the more powerful chiefs, titles had become annual, then for life,
and at last hereditary. At the height of feudalism the kings
held only a nominal and military jurisdiction, and, in assuming
hereditary crowns, they had sanctioned an hereditary partition
of territory which rendered them dependent upon their feudal
barons. With the emergence of the modern States system from
the ruins of feudalism, sovereignty became concentrated in the
hands of a few powerful rulers; and really sovereign States began
to assert their rights, and to secure them by treaties and con-
ventions.
The institution of chivalry originated the code of knightly
honor, and was permeated, sentimentally at least, with principles
of courtesy and justice. It was indirectly promotive of the de-
velopment of International Law by creating a universal comity
among members of the knightly profession, and by securing the
better treatment of slaves and captives, and the keeping of faith
with strangers and enemies.
The most potent influence upon the early period of Interna-
tional Law was undoubtedly the Roman Church. As the politi-
cal power of Rome declined the Church grew into an organiza-
tion of great central authority and influence, practically univer-
sal throughout Europe, and gradually assumed the imperial
functions of the decayed empire, strengthened by spiritual pre-
tensions that gave it command over every individual mind in
Europe. The Roman law, the greatest system of jurisprudence
that the world has ever known, universalized and adapted in the
Canon Law, continued its sway over the greater part of Europe.
The history of the Holy Roman Empire records the absorption
of the political power of its temporal head by the originally co-
brdinate spiritual head, until the Pope came to be recognized as
the embodiment of imperial jurisdiction. He became the arbi-
trator of international disputes, and his representatives were
the omnipresent agents of a united Christendom. The cecumen-
ical councils, were, in a sense, international congresses, which
served to preserve the peace of Europe. With the breaking out
of religious wars, in which Catholicism and Protestantism were
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
arrayed against each other, and the consequent subdivision of
Europe into Catholic and Protestant States, the papal influence in
the settlement of disputes gradually subsided, and has now
almost vanished from the earth. The necessity of securing inter-
national rights by other means than war, however, was undimin-
ished; and the formulation of the principles of equity between
sovereign States became the more imperative.
Where religion had failed, science was invoked, and Hrgo
Grotius, a Protestant jurist and publicist of great experience and
noble genius, in 1623 published the first systematic work on
International Law, under the title De Jure Belli et Pacis. The
Law of Nations was based by Grotius upon the eternal principles
of natural justice, but he was a profound student of the Roman
Law, and his work may be considered as resting upon historical
as well as natural foundations. His treatise has been translated
into all languages, and "has elicited the admiration of all
nations and of all succeeding generations." As Halleck has said,
"Its author is universally regarded as the great master-builder
of the science of International Jurisprudence."
2. It is easy, in the light of the foregoing sketch, to see what
are the sources of International Law, although, as Leone Levi
has said, "As it is now recognized, it is the creation of compara-
tively recent years-the result of the combined influence of phi-
losophy and ethics, religion and civilization, commerce and poli-
tical economy, to say nothing of the action of accelerated means
of communication, such as railways, steamships and electric
telegraphs."
Following the order of certainty in the determination of what
International Law at the moment actually is, we may say that its
first source is treaties and conventions. As nothing can be inter-
nationally binding which does not have the consent of nations,
voluntary and written compacts are the most certain and effica-
cious in securing rights. Whether or not these embody the
highest conception of justice often depends upon the strength or
weakness of the signatory powers which have given their assent
to treaty provisions. Whenever the obligations are reciprocal,
the presumption is that they are mutually regarded as just.
The decisions of municipal courts upon international ques-
tions and the municipal statutes of sovereign States are, of
course, authoritative for these States upon the ground which they"
definitely cover; as, for example, laws relating to naturalization,
4 International Law, p. x.
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extradition, neutrality and piracy. As these differ widely in
different countries, there arises the important branch of juris-
prudence known as the Conflict of Laws, for which provision
should be made in the formation of a code.
Another source of International Law is the judgments of in-
ternational tribunals, or courts of arbitration. These may fairly
be regarded as precedents which may be invoked by sovereign
States, as municipal decisions are by individuals.
Still another source is to be found in diplomatic correspond-
ence and other State papers as related to particular subjects of
dispute. These are often inaccessible, being regarded as confi-
dential and sometimes as containing State secrets. Most civi-
lized countries now publish large portions at least of this class of
documents.
Next in authority, perhaps, is the Roman Law, especially in
those countries whose municipal codes are based upon it. In
England and the United States, whose municipal law is influ-
enced by English custom as expressed in the Common Law of
England, and not so deeply affected by the Roman Law as that
of the Continent-a tendency to reject its distinctive maxims
has often appeared, and the text-writers on International Juris-
prudence have, accordingly, been grouped into two schools, the
Continental and the Anglo-American. This distinction is, how-
ever, now passing away, and the text-writers are approaching
uniformity upon the cardinal principles of the Laws of Nations.
For the non-professional student of the subject these text-
books are the chief source of information; but they have only
that authority to which the recognized ability of their authors
entitles them. It is a notable fact that two of the most able and
most widely accepted text-writers of International Law have
been Americans, Wheaton representing the North and Calvo the
South American Continent.
Lastly, to complete the sources of International Law, men-
tion must be made of what may be called the Divine Law, which
includes those ultimate principles of reason and those fundamen-
tal ethical conceptions upon which the whole system of human
justice finally reposes. Because it is the most general, it is the
least certain as a source of definite prescription; for it is the
application of these great principles, not their reality or obliga-
tion, that divides opinion and generates dispute.
3. The definite codification of International Law has been
undertaken by several competent hands. In x867 Mr. David
Dudley Field brought before the British Association for Social
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Science a proposition to frame an international code. Mr. Field
was personally qualified for such an undertaking by long expe-
rience as a codifier of municipal law. He produced what is in
reality a complete treatise on the subject, although it bears the
modest title "Outlines of an International Code." One feature
of Mr. Field's code is the introduction of the principles of
arbitration in the settlement of international disputes. His work
attracted great attention in Europe, and has been translated into
French and Italian. In 1873 he assisted in forming an interna-
tional association for the purpose of reforming and codifying the
Laws of Nations, with special reference to the substitution of
arbitration for war. He had also been a member of the peace
conference at Washington in i86x, and presided at the great peace
convention in London in 1890.
The celebrated Swiss jurist, John Kaspar Bluntschli, famous
throughout the world as a writer of works on jurisprudence, has
also undertaken the preparation of an International Code, pub-
lished in 1874, under the title "Le Droit International codifi6."
In x887 the same task was undertaken by Leone Levi, the
well-known Jewish economist of London, whose work as a law
reformer extends to other branches of jurisprudence. His book
on "International Law" in the "International Scientific Series"
is, in reality, a code, although it is designated in the subtitle as
"Materials for a Code." Its scope is wider than that of Field or
Bluntschli, who confined themselves to the natural portion of
the Law of Nations. Levi includes also the positive portion,
supporting his code with a digest of treaties. He also presents a
plan for the settlement of international disputes, which will be
considered in another connection.
None of the codes described above has been officially adopted
by any nation, so that, in the technical sense, there is at present
no absolutely authoritative code of International Law in exist-
ence. And yet it would not be correct to say that the Law of
Nations is a mere branch of ethics or collection of moral pre-
cepts. Treaties and conventions have created a body of definite
and binding obligations which may be regarded as strictly legal
in their effects. The time has come, however, when an inter-
national commission should be authorized to prepare a code; and
this should- be made binding by a general treaty among civilized
States giving it authority as International Law.
II. THE METHODS OF ADJUSTING DIFFERENCES.
It is evident that the mere existence of a body of rules and
maxims recognized as applicable to international relations, how-
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ever equitable and elaborate, is practically useless unless there
is an efficient method of applying it to the conflicting interests
and disputes of nations.
x. The first and most obvious method of adjusting differences
is that of diplomatic negotiation. The right of legation is one of
the oldest and best established of international usages. Embas-
sies for making agreements and conventions with foreign powers
were employed by the most ancient States, and in a rudimentary
form are customary even among barbarous peoples. The extent
to which a sovereign State maintains permanent legations in for-
eign countries is an evidence of its p6litical wisdom. The idea
of permanency of represdntation through ambassadors and min.
isters has grown with the development of means of communica-
tion, until it has become the universal custom of civilized states
to maintain legations in all the countries with which they have
intimate relations of trade or general intercourse. The mere
fact that a State is thus represented often secures it against dis-
crimination that would otherwise be exercised; and the value of
a diplomatic agent consists less in what he may be able to adjust
than in what he may be able to prevent. The diplomatic history
of every country would illustrate the utility of the. personal pres-
ence of a qualified representative at each of the great capitals of
the world. This advantage, however, depends largely upon the
intellectual, social and linguistic qualifications of the envoys
chosen. It is also seriously diminished by sending out diplo-
matic agents of lower rank than those accredited by other pow-
ers to the same government, thus condemning them to juniority
and subordination in the diplomatic corps, and stripping them of
the social dignity and influence which might be serviceable to
their government. Still another impediment to this means of
adjustment is a chauvinistic temper in the foreign office, where
ignorance or discourtesy may cost a country valuable rights or
bring upon it humiliation and contempt.
2. A second method of adjusting differences is that of volun-
tary or invited mediation by a third party. At the Congress of
Paris, in 1856, the representatives of Austria, France, Great
Britain, Russia and Turkey, recommended that "States between
which serious disagreements might arise should, before appeal-
ing to arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances admit, to the
good offices of friendly powers." This is a very moderate and
highly qualified recommendation; but it indicates a growing love
of peace and a sense of responsibility for war.
3. A third way of avoiding the sacrifice of national rights
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without incurring the consequences of battle is arbitration, which
differs from mediation in the degree of judicial formality with
which it is conducted.
Arbitration of disputes between governments was practiced
to some extent by the ancient Greeks, and it is thought that the
Athenian Symmachy had from the beginning a common tribunal
at Delos, where the treasury of the allied States was located.
But the range of this method of attaining justice was certainly
very limited in ancient times.
During the Middle Ages the Pope often intervened as arbi-
trator, and was frequently the referee of the ecclesiastical coun-
cils which deposed and excommunicated princes, settled ques-
tions of tolls and taxes, and decided rights of sovereignty.
Among modern States the application of arbitration has not
been extensive, although Vattel about the middle of the
eighteenth century commended it as a "reasonable and natural
mode of deciding such disputes as do not directly affect the safety
of a nation." About seventy modern international cases have
been settled by arbitration, nearly half of them between the
United States and other countries. The most important of these
was the settlement of the Alabama claims against Great Britain.
Provision for this settlement was made by the Treaty of Wash-
ington, in 187x, which provided for a commission of five arbi-
trators, before whom the case of each nation was argued by dis-
tinguished counsel. The commission rendered a decision in
which both countries acquiesced, awarding an indemnity of $i5,-
5oo,ooo to the United States.
. Distinguished sovereigns and military men have been earnest
advocates of arbitration and able jurists have proposed plans for
extending its application. General Grant once wrote, "I look
forward to an epoch when a court recognized by all nations will
settle all differences." General Sheridan said in a public
address, "I mean what I say when I express the belief that in
time arbitration will rule the whole world." According to Sir
Lyon Playfair, the late Emperor Alexander of Russia was so
impressed with the importance of the peaceable settlement of
international disputes that "lie rose from his bed in the night, and
wrote a plan that all crowned heads should join in a conclusion
to submit to arbitration whatever differences might arise among
them instead of resorting to the sword."
On October 31, 1887, a memorial, signed by more than one-
third of the members of the British Parliament, and representing
more than seven hundred thousand workingmen, was presented
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to President Cleveland, requesting his good offices in behalf of
peace. The President sent the memorial to Congress, and on
the 4 th of April, x89o, a concurrent resolution was adopted by
the Senate and the House "that the President be, and is hereby,
requested to invite, from time to time, as fit occasions may
arrive, negotiations with any government with which the United
States has or may have diplomatic relations, to the end that any
differences or disputes arising between the two governments,
which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency, may be referred
to arbitration, and be peaceably adjusted by such means." As
Sir Lyon Playfair has said: "To the United States the lovers
of peace look with hope and confidence that she will take a lead-
ing part in the promotion of peace by international arbitration.
Her growth is the great fact of modern history. She is a coun-
try of boundless resources, and has shown that she can carry on
great and successful wars, so that her intervention as a peace-
maker could not be misinterpreted."
We may now examine briefly the plans that have been pro-
posed for a wider extension of this method.
(x) The plan of David Dudley Field embraces the following
programme. When an agreement cannot otherwise.be effected,
a Joint High Commission of ten, chosen in equal numbers by
the litigants, shall report within six months their efforts to rec-
oncile their principals. This is merely preliminary. If they are
unsuccessful these parties shall give notice of the result to the
other nations that have accepted the code, and the latter shall
provide for a High Tribunal by the nomination of four persons
each, from whom the contestants may eliminate, by successive
rejections, thos3 whom they do not approve, until the number is
reduced to seven. These seven are to compose the court. The
code provides for a compulsory resort to this procedure. If any
State accepting the code shall begin a war in violation of it, the
others are bound to resist the offending nation by force.
(2) The programme of Leone Levi proposes a Council of
International Arbitration, to which each State adopting the code
is to nominate a number of members selected from persons of
high reputation and standing, to serve for a fixed period of years.
The council is to be declared existent as soon as any two States
have concurred in its organization. When organized, 6ther
States will be invited to nominate members. On the occurrence
of any dispute between the States the council will call a meeting
and offer its assistance. When the contending States have
accepted the services of the council, this body will nominate some
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of its members, and each of the litigant States will nominate
other persons, to form a High Court of International Arbitration
for adjudicating the dispute; and the award shall be binding
upon the States. The High Court shall be constituted with re-
gard to the character and locality of the dispute, and shall exist
for the one case only. Physical force is not to be resorted to,
either to compel reference to the council or to enforce compli-
ance with the award. The dispute, however, whether referred
or not, is to be considered by the council, and its judgment is to
be communicated to all the States represented by it. The coun-
cil will make rules of procedure for itself and for the High Court.
The seat of the council is to be a neutral city, such as Berne or
Brussels. The cost of maintaining the council shall be borne
equally by the concurring States, but the cost of the High Court
by the contesting parties in equal shares.
III. THE MEANS OF ENFORCING JUDGMENT.
The evident weakness of these plans of arbitration is their
inefficiency in securing compliance with judgment when ren-
dered. Municipal law is enforced by definite penalties, which
are applicable by the executive branch of government. Both of
the schemes just described for the establishment of an Interna-
tional Court leave it absolutely powerless to enfore its decisions.
And here it becomes evident that sovereign States differ essen-
tially from any other parties at law, and this distinction is seen
to lie in sovereignty itself. Here arises the most difficult prob-
lem in the task of instituting international justice.
i. A solution that has been many times urged, but which is
practically as chimerical as it is ideally perfect, is the universal
federation of States. Castel St. Pierre contemplated a perpetual
alliance or league, of which all the States of Europe should be
members. War was to be rendered impossible, except in case of
revolution, and all nations were to be united as the guardians of
peace. Jeremy Bentham, the great English jurist, toward the
close of the eighteenth century sketched the plan of a General
Congress consisting of two deputies from each State. Military
establishments were to be reduced in some fair ratio, colonies
were to be abandoned in order to eliminate a frequent cause of
strife, and refractory States were to be put under the ban. A
fixed contingent of troops was to be at the command of the Con-
gress to enfore its decrees. About the same time the great Ger-
man philosopher, Immanuel Kant, published an essay entitled
"Zum Ewigen Frieden," proposing that no State should be
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merged by sale, exchange, gift or inheritance in another state;
that no State should interfere with the affairs of another, that
standing armies should gradually cease, and, finally, that all
States should adopt republican constitutions and enter into a
confederation, conferring upon every man a citizenship of the
world.
Such speculations are dreams rather than plans, and yet
when we consider that as late as i818 Lord Ellenborough de-
clared the right of English litigants "to settle their disputes by
combat," it would be adventurous to predict the impossibility of
equal advances in the social sense of nations. Still, it is hardly
credible that sovereign States will in any way abridge their sov-
ereignty by a mode of federation that would deprive them of
independence. As Sheldon Amos has said, "The States of
Europe do not at present wish to submit themselves to any cen-
tral force, nor even to create such a force out of their own body
by the most adequate representative system imaginable." And
yet he feels compelled to add that all indications "point to the
gradual elaboration among States of what may be properly called
a supreme political authority. What form this authority will
take," he continues, "it may be impossible for us, in this gener-
ation, so much as to guess; just as the members of an early,
spontaneously developing village-community had no materials
from which to construct a notion of civil government in its later
sense. 's
2. Another proposed mode of securing the acceptance of the
decisions of an international court is the voluntary disarmament
of nations, rendering the resort to war less probable by diminish-
ing the military spirit. A nation preoccupied with industry,
devoid of military ambition, and temporarily unfitted to engage
in military operations, it is argued, will be more readily disposed
to accept a judicial decision than a State which is constantly
prepared for war, influenced by the martial spirit, and confident
of success in case of a conflict. This is undoubtedly true; but
the fact is also an argument against disarmament to a State sur-
rounded with enemies, and liable to be exposed to foreign aggre-
sion if its standing army is reduced.
There are, however, so many reasons for the reduction of mil-
itary forces, that a just convention based upon the plan of pro-
portionate reduction would be an inestimable blessing to man-
kind. The enormous taxes required to maintain the standing
armies of Europe, the abstraction of so many productive agents
a Science of Law, p. 327.
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from industrial pursuits to serve in the army, and the constant
menace to peace which military ambition inevitably offers are
certainly good reasons for at least a relative disarmament of
nations. But there can be little hope of this so long as the per-
petuation of dynasties is esteemed a matter of importance, for it
is on this account rather than for national security that standing
armies are required. A general adoption of republican constitu-
tions is a step in political evolution which must precede any con-
siderable reduction of standing armies. This aid to the enforce-
ment of the judgments of international courts belongs, there-
fore, to the f uture rather than to the present, and cannot be
counted upon in the formation of immediate plans for arbitra-
tion. And so it becomes evident since nations will not abrogate
either their sovereignty or their means of self-defence, that reli-
ance must be placed upon the moral and the social means of en-
forcing such decisions. As the movement is an ethical one, it is
probably in every way best to attempt to advance it by purely
ethical considerations, which have at least one great advantage-
that they appeal to what is best in men universally, and are most
effective when they are addressed to the reason and the con-
science in whose interest they are urged.
In conclusion, the following plan of procedure seems to com-
mend fiself as not altogether hopelessly impracticable for secur-
ing to civilized nations the administration of justice without
resort to the costly and frequently unjust arbitrament of battle:
(x) The negotiation of a general treaty extended to all sover-
eign States willing to enter into it, but primarily adapted to the
requirements of England and the United States, having for its
sole object the establishment of a permanent International Court,
and requiring no other signatory powers to give it effect than
the two named above.
(2) The appointment of an expert commission by the powers
accepting the treaty to codify in separate codes the Laws of
Nations, (a) as a body of rational jurisprudence or abstract jus-
tice, and (b) as a body of positive law now existing in treaties
and conventions.
(3) The adoption of a plan for the formation of a permanent
International Court, with jurisdiction covering all forms of dis-
pute between the contracting nations which do not involve the
sovereignty or independence of these States.
The International Court should of course be constituted upon
lines to be determined by a representative commission of experts
after the most deliberate discussion. The following propositions,
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.
however, seem to be sufficiently well established to deserve the
respectful consideration of such a commission:
(r) All the sovereign States having a part in the treaty should
have an equal number of representatives in court. This follows
directly from the sovereign character of the States which may be
signatory to the treaty. To apportion representation would abolish
equality before the court. This principle has been recognized in
the formation of our Senate, in which Rhode Island and Dela-
ware have an equal number of -Senators with New York and
Pennsylvania, although the former are comparatively insignifi-
cant in territory and population. The questions adjudicated by
a court are not questions of power, but of justice; and a small
State may have as good a cause as a great one.
(2) The judicial office should be held for life, providing for re-
moval in case of corruption, incapacity or extreme old age. This
would render possible the creation of a judicial body minutely
conversant with International Law, precedent, and political his-
tory, and at the same time would place the court above selfish con-
siderations.
(3) The court should have jurisdiction over all cases not affecting
the autonomy of the contracting States. Provision should be made
for private as well as public redress, under proper conditions of
preliminary attempts at mediation. All questions effecting the
autonomy of States should be beyond the jurisdiction of the court,
otherwise it might become the medium of depriving States of
their sovereignty, and the suspicion of this would make the
establishment of the court impossible.
(4) The court should sit in a neutral territory. This would facili-
tate justice by rendering impossible, or at least difficult, the
attempt to influence the court by public opinion or otherwise.
Both Switzerland and Belgium are neutralized by existing con-
ventions, and one or the other could be chosen, as the character
of the case might require, for the holding of the court.
(5) The transactions of the court should be open and public, and
all its proceedings should be recorded and published. Justice is fond
of the light, as injustice is of secrecy. A greater care is taken in
reaching a decision when all the grounds and conditions of it are
universally known.
(6) All petitions, pleadings, and decisions should be in writing.
This accords with the practice of the highest courts, and rules out
ambiguity of statement, the effect of personal influence, and
appealp to the feelings, while it conduces to precision, delibera-
tion, and permanence.
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(7) Refusal to submit to the court a case within its jurisdiction,
or to comply with its decision, should be followed by the permanent
exclusion of the offending State from its privileges and protection.
This is a provision of the utmost importance, for it will solve the
problem of enforcing the decisions of such a court. In effect, it
outlaws the lawless. It presents to every State a choice between
obedience to the code and deprivation of its obvious advantages.
The effectiveness of this provision undoubtedly depends, in a
egrat degree, upon the extent to which the code is accepted; but
it cannot be doubted that, if the most powerful nations were
united under the jurisdiction of the court, it would become a
moral impossibility to refuse or violate its requirements.
When we consider how jealous the German and Italian States
were of one another and of any supreme authority, much less
than a century ago, and follow the history of German and Italian
unity to its present consummation, we learn two important les-
sons. The first is that, when the ambition of monarchs is
checked by constitutional limitations, wars become less easy and-
frequent; for the people are able to restrain public ministers
from courses of conduct hostile to the welfare of the masses.
Another lesson is that, with the growth of popular intelligence,
traditional claims to sovereignty fade into smaller proportions
and less flaming colors, and industrial and commercial well-being
becomes the prime consideration of statesmen. We may, there-
fore, confidently expect that, with the development of constitu-
tional government and experience of its benefits, there will fol-
low a gradual breaking down of those merely local conceptions
of sovereignty which are so powerful in the cruder states of soci-
ety; and universal equity, secured by legal institutions, will con-
tinue to become dearer to the minds of men. The law of politi-
cal evolution seems to be that larger areas and populations tend
to be unified under homogeneous constitutional forms, whose
inner analogy or hidden identity is ever becoming more apparent.
To the vision of the poet there has already appeared "the parlia-
ment of man, the federation of the world." Such foregleams of
coming events are never realistically accurate; but the spontane-
ous activity of the imagination is always controlled by the exist-
ence of elements that are about to combine, not, indeed, as in
the dream of the poet, but according to nature's own law of
change and progress.
All that has yet been said or written upon this great problem
probably constitutes little more than the rude scaffolding of that
great temple of international justice whose dome will yet shelter
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the nations of the earth from the wrongs of oppression and the
horrors of battle. But its foundations are laid in the moral
nature of humanity; and, although-like a vast cathedral grown
old with passing centuries-it is still uncompleted, we may bring
our unhewn stones to lay upon its rising walls, in the faith that
its invisible Builder and Maker will shape them to a place in the
permanent structure.
David Jayne Hill.
